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COMMENTS
STATE TAXATION OF IMPORTS: A NEW TEST
The Constitution prohibits the states from levying any taxes upon imports.'
The pertinent section, absolute in its terms, is to be construed strictly, and can
in no sense be interpreted as a prohibition of merely discriminatory taxes?
The authors of the Constitution in framing this clause did so in order to "pro-
tect the exclusive power of the national government to tax imports and to pre-
vent what.., would amount to the imposition of additional import duties by
states in which the property might be found or stored before its sale or use."3
Thus, the states' acknowledged power to tax property within their juris-
diction4 is qualified to the extent that so long as the articles retain their status
as "imports" they remain immune from state taxation. Recent Supreme Court
decisions5 have discussed in detail this problem of determining when an im-
ported article ceases to be an import.
IAPoPTS FOR SALF,
The landmark case with respect to goods imported for sale is Brown v.
Maryland.6 There the Court was confronted with the problem as to whether
a state legislature could constitutionally subject an importer of foreign goods
for sale to a state license tax as a prerequisite to selling the imported bale or
package. The State of Maryland argued that the goods lost their immunity
201(7) defines injury and sickness as "accidental injury, disease, infection or illness," and §
201(8) defines disability during the employment as the "inability of an employee, as a re-
sult of injury or sickness not arising out of and in the course of an employment, to per-
form the regular duties of his employment or the duties of any other employment which
his employer may offer him at his regular wages and which his injury or sickness does not
prevent him from performing." Thus, in Shapiro v. Central Poultry Corp., 284 App. Div.
309, 131 N.Y.S.2d 716 (3d Dep't 1954), it was held that a typhoid fever carrier was en-
titled to disability benefits where he was unable to work without infecting others, though
he was not physically disabled. In the light of this progressive approach and the need
for employers to protect personnel in so many "fringe" situations, the legislature should
respond to the present problem, and formulate a policy in agreement with the industrial
needs of the times, for as has been pointed out by Horovitz "until every state adopts [a
liberal] construction ... or the legislatures carefully delete the words 'by accident' or
'accidental,' employees in a small minority of states will be faced with the alternative of
trying to prove a slip, a twist, or fall, or excessive or unusual work or over-exertion or
exposure, or other face-saving fortuitous cause, or be relegated to ... arity. ..:
Horovitz, Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 19 NACCA L.J. 34, 43 (1957).
1. U.S. Const. arL I, § 10 provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws . ... .
2. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 76 (1946).
3. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 664 (1945).
4. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827).
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959); Hooven & Allison
Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
6. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419 (1827).
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upon entering the country.7 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion
of the Court, while admitting that there must be some time when the prohibition
ceases and the states' power to tax commences," stated that to hold this
point of time is the instant the articles enter the country would defeat the
prohibition. 9 It was the Chief Justice's opinion that the importer by paying duties
to the United States purchased the privilege to incorporate, commingle or sell
the goods, and only after the exercise of this right should the goods be exposed
to state taxation.' 0 While not attempting to lay down a universal rule," he
enunciated what was to be the prevailing principle in succeeding cases:
"[Wjhen the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has be-
come incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country,
it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become
subject to the taxing power of the state .... "12 The Chief Justice pro-
ceeded to hold that goods, although remaining the property of the importer,
while stored in his warehouse in the original form or package in which
they were imported were not "so acted upon" as to become "incorporated"
with the property of this country so as to lose their constitutional immunity.'"
It was indicated that in addition to the breaking of the original package, the
importer would also be separated from his exemption by the use'4 of the im-
ported goods or the sale' 5 thereof. Although not propounded by Marshall as
necessarily exclusive, these three categories have for more than a century been
the sole instances where the Court has found the property so "acted upon" as
to render it subject to state taxation. 6
In Low v. Austin' 7 the state assessed for tax purposes imported wines which
were stored in their original cases in a warehouse, awaiting sale. The Court,
7. Mr. Chief Justice Taney, counsel for Maryland in this case, later repudiated this
earlier contention: "But further and more mature reflection has convinced me that the
rule [Brown v. Maryland] laid down by the Supreme Court is a just and safe one, and
perhaps the best that could have been adopted for preserving the right of the United
States on the one hand, and of the States on the other, and preventing collision between
them." The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 573, 575 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.).
8. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827).
9. Ibid.
10. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 435-49.
11. Id. at 441. It was his opinion that it would be premature to state any rule as
universal until the cases arose.
12. Id. at 441-42.
13. Id. at 442. The tax was held to be "too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the
prohibition in the Constitution." Ibid.
14. Id. at 442-43. A tax upon imported fish was upheld in 1928, where they had
"become, through processing, handling and sale, a part of the mass of property subject
to taxation by the State." Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124, 126 (1928).
15. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). That a sale will destroy
the import status of the goods has never been questioned.
16. The "original package" doctrine has perhaps most frequently been referred to and
approved. See, e.g., Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); May v. New
Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
17. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
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espousing the rationale of Brown v. Maryland, held the tax unconstitutional:
"[T]he authority given to import necessarily carried with it a right to sell
the goods in the form and condition ... in which they were imported .... ms
The Court determined that the goods retained their distinctive import status,
and were thus without the jurisdiction of the state's power to taxYP
May v. New Orleans20 is significant only in that it is illustrative of the
Court's meaning of "original package." There the packer placed the separate
packages received from the manufacturer into large cases for shipment. The
Court held that this large case in which the packages were shipped was the
original package, each separate package losing its distinctive character as an
import with the opening of the large case.2
The law, therefore, in regard to goods imported for sale is quite clear. It
is not so clear, however, in regard to goods imported for manufacture.
Goons IpoRTED roi MANuFCTtn E
The Court was first confronted with the problem of whether goods imported
for use in manufacture lose their immunity from state taxation upon storage
in the importer's warehouse, pending use in the manufacturing operations, in
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt 22 Bales of hemp and other fibers, brought
from outside the United States,2 3 were stored in their original packages in the
petitioner's warehouse at his factory, preliminary to their use by petitioner in
the manufacture of cordage. A three to six months supply was kept on hand.
The ad valorem tax imposed on this property was sustained by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, the court holding that Brown v. Maryland applied only to im-
ports for sale, and that imports for use became upon storage, notwithstanding
the fact that they were still in the original package, so commingled with the
common mass as to be subject to state taxation. 24
The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the
Court, ruled that there was no theoretical or practical reason for saying
that goods imported for manufacture lose their distinctive "import" char-
acter any sooner or more readily than goods imported for sale.3 The con-
15. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 35.
20. 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
21. Id. at 503.
22. 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
23. It was contended that title did not vest in the petitioner until after the arrival of
the goods in this country and that, therefore, he was not an importer. The Court rejected
this contention, holding that it was "immaterial whether the title to the merchandiLe
imported vested in him who caused it to be brought to this country at the time of hip-
ment or only after its arrival here." Id. at 662.
The tax commissioner's contention that the goods from the Philippines were not imports
because they were not from a foreign country xwas similarly rejected. The Court held that
the goods need not be brought from a foreign country to be imports, but need only be
brought from without the country. Id. at 671.
24. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 142 Ohio St. 235, 51 NE.2d 723 (1943).
25. 324 U.S. at 667-68.
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stitutional necessity that the immunity survive the arrival of the goods "until
a point is reached, capable of practical determination, when it can fairly be
said that it has become a part of the mass of taxable property within a state
..-26 is equally applicable to both cases.27 As in the case of goods imported
for sale, the immunity subsists so long as the goods remain in their original
package and have not been devoted to the purpose for which they were im-
ported.28 The Court held that the goods, not having been subjected to manu-
facture, i.e., not devoted to the use for which they had been imported, retained
their immunity. 29
The Court reserved decision on the question of whether "the presence of
some fibers in the factory was so essential to current manufacturing require-
ments that they could be said to have entered the process of manufacture, and
hence ...put to the use for which they were imported . . . ,,18 Mr. Chief
Justice Stone found any discussion of the virtue or applicability of this "cur-
rent operational needs" test unnecessary as the state court had not rested its
decision on that ground and, furthermore, the record afforded no evidence that
the fibers in question were currently needed for manufacturing operations. 1
The consolidated opinion of Youngstown Skeet & Tube Co. v. Bowers and
United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma32 was predicated upon the
very point which the Hooven Court declined to consider. The facts, although
seemingly analogous to those of Hooven, warrant some detail.
The Youngstown Corporation, a manufacturer of iron and steel, imported
ore from five countries for use in its manufacturing process. The ore was
stored in an enclosed area adjacent to the factory with the ores segregated
according to the country of origin. The company endeavored to maintain
a supply to meet its manufacturing requirements for at least three months.
The Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the proposed ad valorem tax based on
the average value of the ore in the yards during the year.33
The Plywood Corporation imported both lumber and veneers for use in its
manufacture of veneered wood products. The lumber was stored in the storage
yard adjacent to the factory in such a way as to permit air to circulate through
the stacks in order to "air dry" the wood. The veneers were stored separately
in the bundles in which they were received. Both were stored for use as they
were needed in the day to day operation of the plant. Petitioner paid the
assessed tax based upon one half the value of the lumber and veneers, and
26. Id. at 667.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 668.
29. Id. at 667.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 667. However, Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, found that the imports were
to be used in current production and kept as a "backlog" to assure constant operation.
Id. at 688-89.
32. 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
33. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 166 Ohio St. 122, 140 N.E.2d 313
(1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
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proceeded to sue for its recovery. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained
the tax.:4
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Whittaker, as did Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, found the principal question to be whether
the importer had so acted upon the imported materials as to cause them to
lose their distinctive character as "imports. 3 5 Finding the third category of
Brown v. Maryanud applicable to the facts at hand, Mr. Justice Whittaker
ruled that when the goods imported for use are used for the purpose for which
they are imported they cease to be imports.30 The Court thereby espoused the
prevailing principles of both Brown v. Maryland and Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt. The difficulty, however, arises with the Court's application of these
principles to the case before it.U
The materials in both situations, the Court held, were irrevocably com-
mitted to use in manufacturing at the factory because they were required to
meet the current operational needs, and were actually used to supply the daily
needs. They had, therefore, entered the process of manufacture.s Thus, the
Court, applying for the first time the "current operational needs" test, found
that goods stored in their original package are being "used" within the mean-
ing of Brown v. Maryland for the purpose for which they were imported.
It has been established that goods lose their import status when they are
used for the purpose for which imported, not when they are "held for such
use.139 The imports here were not imported for the purpose of mere storage
in the storage yard, but rather for use in the manufacture of a finished product.
They are not so used until they have actually entered into the manufacturing
process.40 Therefore, it appears that the Court, while purporting to remain
within the categories of Brown v. Maryland, is in reality establishing an in-
dependent criterion for stripping the import of its immunity. Congress is con-
stitutionally authorized to consent to, and thereby regulate, state taxation of
imports.4 ' The absence of legislation affecting Brown v. Maryland for more
34. United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma, 2 Wis. 2d 567, 87 NW.2d 481
(1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
35. 358 U.S. at 536-37.
36. Id. at 542-43.
37. It is submitted that perhaps the Court is not applying these principles, but estab-
lishing its own independent test. See p. - infra.
38. 358 U.S. at 545-48.
39. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 US. 652
(1945), interpreted Brown v. Maryland, supra note 8, to mean "goods held for use" are
taxable. Id. at 687-91. This proposition was refuted in Powell, State Taxation of Imports
-When Does an Import Cease to be an Import?, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 858, 862 (1945).
40. The majority, having found all the goods in question in the Youngstown case, supra
note 32, to be taxable, did not have occasion to consider the specific lumber vwhich had
been stored in such a way as to permit "air drying." As to this portion of the "imports"
in question, Mr. Justice Frankfurter conceded that they had entered into the process of
manufacture and were, thus, subject to state taxation. 358 U.S. at $64-66.
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. "iT]he Constitution gives Congress authority to consent
to state taxation of imports and hence to lay down its own test for determining when the
immunity ends ... ." Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 668 (1945).
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than a century would certainly imply congressional approval of the categories
therein delineated. Any supplement thereto would seem properly within the
realm of the legislature, rather than the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The "current operational needs" test as applied in the instant case is in
effect discriminating against the manufacturer in favor of the seller. The mer-
chant in Low v. Austin required his wines for current selling operations, just
as the importers here needed the goods in question for manufacturing opera-
tions. Yet the goods imported for sale remained immune from state taxation.
There does not appear to be any sustainable reason to hold goods currently
needed for manufacture vulnerable to state taxation, and at the same time
hold goods needed for selling operations exempt therefrom. Furthermore, it
has reasonably been submitted that goods awaiting processing have an even
stronger claim to immunity than goods imported for sale.42 The latter if sold
out of state will escape taxation by the state in which it was stored awaiting
sale, whereas the goods for manufacture will become taxable upon entering
the manufacturing process, which will invariably be in the same state.
The "current operational needs" test will undoubtedly result in considerable
confusion in its application. What property will be deemed necessary for
current operational needs? In the Hooven case, wherein a "minimum working
inventory" of from three to six months supply was the property in question,
the Court said there was no basis for saying that the fibers were required for
current needs. Now, however, in the Youngstown case, where sufficient ore
was kept on hand to meet estimated requirements for at least three months,
the Court has found the test satisfied.
It was urged by the majority in Youngstown that to hold the goods in ques-
tion "imports" would result in a discrimination in favor of foreign goods not
intended by the Constitution. This proposition is without merit. The framers
of the Constitution in permitting state taxation of property, while at the same
time prohibiting state taxation of imports, could not have but recognized, and
thereby acquiesced in, the resulting discrimination with regard to state taxation
in favor of foreign goods.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that the result
of the majority's decision was that "if imported goods are needed, they are
taxable. If useless, they retain their constitutional immunity. ' 48 While this is
admittedly rather strong language, nevertheless, the decision greatly encroaches
upon and limits the constitutional prohibition, at least insofar as goods im-
ported for manufacture are concerned. It seems that there are very few in-
stances when property imported for manufacture will not comply with the
literal language of the "current operational needs" test. Very rarely will a
well managed business tie up its capital in inventories, other than that amount
necessary to meet its short term requirements. Consequently, practically all
42. Powell, supra note 39, at 871.
43. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 570 (1959).
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imports will be imported to meet the current operational needs of the business.
What then will be "imports" within the meaning of the Constitution?
It will be interesting to note whether the Court, given the appropriate facts,
will follow suit and apply this new formula to the heretofore settled area of
imports for sale. In view of the strong language of Hoovcz refusing to dis-
tinguish the two purposes of import, it is conceivable that the Court will, upon
a finding that the goods are currently needed for the selling operations of the
retailer or wholesaler, hold the merchandise to be without the constitutional
prohibition, and thereby subject to state taxation, notwithstanding that it is still
in its original package. This of course, would practically destroy any applica-
tion or significance of the prohibition.
